Labor Law by Whitehouse, John C.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 12 
Number 3 
Volume 12 Issues 3-4 




John C. Whitehouse 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
John C. Whitehouse, Labor Law, 12 U. Miami L. Rev. 344 (1958) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol12/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 




Like the two previous surveys,, this article connects directly with its
predecessor.2 Florida Supreme Court decisions, federal decisions and N.L.
R.B. action of local interest have been considered herein together with the
activities of the 1957 Florida Legislature. The newly-established District
Courts of Appeal3 have handed down no decisions concerning labor law
within the period covered by this survey. \Ve will also again discuss
cases concerning tie individual employment contract where such appear
to be of interest in the field of labor-management relations.
FLORIDA DECISIONS
The reader is referred to the previous survey for a brief summary4 of
the Florida Labor Organizations Act' upon which, together with consti-
tutional provisions, " the decisions of the supreme court are, in part at
least, based.
a) In general
Flaherty v. Metal Products Corporation' is significant in that, by dicta,
it summarized the views of the supreme court concerning various aspects
of arbitration (before the recent statutory modifications) 8 as applied to
labor law. The plaintiffs and the defendant (employees and employer, re-
spectively) had entered into a labor-management contract the full terms
of which do not appear in the court's opinion. However, it appears that
the contract provided for arbitration" of any dispute arising thereunder.
* Member of the Florida Bar,
1. 8 Ml^iA L.Q. 246 (1953); 10 MlAlli L.Q. 208 (1956).
2. 10 MiAmi L.Q. 208 (1956). The survey period covered by this article extends
fron August 1, 1955 to August 1, 1957 (82 So.2d through 92 So.2d, 6 Fla. Supp.
through 9 Fla. Supp., 349 U.S. through 351 U.S., 208 F.2d through 246 F.2d, 131 F.
Supp. through 153 F. Supp.).
3. 'Fhese courts were created by amendment to FLA. CONST., Art V, §§ 1, 5 by
the 1957 Legislature. \While the supreme court may, under the amended provisions,
be called upon to decide constitutional questions, there seems little doubt that the great
bulk of the appellate work in the field of labor law will be handled by the district courts
of appeal.
4. 10 MIAMfi L. . 208, 212.
5. FLA. STAT. §§ 447.09(I)-(13) (1957).
6. In particular, FLA. CONST. D.R. § 12 (the controversial "right to work" pro-
vision) and FLA. CO ST. D.R. § 13, (guaranteeing freedom of speed' and, consequently,
the "free speech' aspects of picketing).
7. 83 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1955).
8. FLA. STAT. § 857.11-31 (1957).
9. Section 3, Article 9 of the contract provided as follows:
.. . should any complaint, dispute or grievance not be adjusted or settled
the services of the United States Conciliation Service should be requested
by both the Employer and the Union.
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Such a dispute did arise, was duly submitted for arbitration, and an award
evidently unsatisfactory to the employees'0 was entered. The employees
thereupon filed a petition for a declaratory decree in the local circuit
court, seeking court interpretation of certain portions of the contract. The
employer pleaded arbitration and award and, at the same time, filed a
motion for "Summary Decree on the Pleadings,"11 which motion was
granted by the trial court.
On appeal, the error specifically assigned was the entry of summary
judgment, where it appeared that several questions of both law and fact
were raised by the pleadings but there were no affidavits or depositions to
support the position taken by the employer. The court held that the trial
court erred in entering summary judgment tinder such circumstances and,
therefore, reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Thus, it will be seen that the court disposed of the controversy on
purely procedural grounds. However, by dicta, the opinion pointed out 2
the previously well-established rule of Florida law"3 that an agreement
to submit a dispute to arbitration, whether arising under the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement or otherwise, would not be enforced in the
courts of Florida because such an agreement, if enforced, would oust the
courts of their fundamental jurisdiction tv entertain and to settle contro-
versies.
The legislature has, we hasten to point out, in its 1957 Session, taken
steps to change this rule of law by enacting a new Florida Arbitration
Code; this is briefly discussed under "Legislative Enactments" at page 369
of this article.
The court was confronted with an interpretation of Section 449.01,
Florida Statutes, relating to the licensing and regulation of private employ-
ment agencies, in Florida Industrial Commission v. Manpower, Inc. of
Miami.14 Suit to enforce compliance with the provisions of the act was
brought against Manpower, Inc. by the Florida Industrial Commission,
which alleged that Manpower's activities fell within the purview of the
act and that its requirements were not being met. From an adverse circuit
court decision on the grounds that the act was not applicable to the
defendant, the commission appealed.
Manpower, it seems, is a rather unusual organization in that it main-
tains a large staff of typists, bookkeepers, truck helpers, warehousemen,
10. To quote the court (83 So.2d at 10):
... Thereafter, on November 17, 1953, the said arbiter entered his award,
deciding among other things that the Defendant acted properly . ..
11. 83 So.2d at 10.
12. Ibid.
13. See Fenster v. Makovsky. 67 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1953); Duval County v. Charles-
ton Engineering and Contracting Co., 101 Fla. 341, 134 So. 509 (1931); Steinhardt v.
Consolidated Grocery Co., 80 Fla. 531, 86 So. 431 (1920).
14. 91 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1956).
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comptometer operators, and persons skilled in a variety of other occupa-
tions, whose sole function is to be "rented out" to other firms who occa-
sionally happen to need the services of such workers. Manpower pays
the workers' salaries directly from its own payroll. The customer for whom
the work is to be performed enters into what might be called a "rental"
contract with Manpower for the workers' services, but there is no contract
between the customer and the worker. The pertinent sections of the act
sought to be invoked, as quoted by the court, are as follows:S
Any person, firm or corporation, who for hire or for profit, shall
undertake to secure employment or help, or . . . offers to secure
employment or help, shall be deemed a private employment agent,
and be subject to the provisions of this chapter . . . (emphasis
added)
The supreme court affirmed the decree rendered below, holding that
while Manpower did furnish "help," its activities were unrelated to those
usually performed by an employment agency and, consequently, were
beyond the scope of the regulatory statute. It was pointed out in the
opinion that the purpose of the act was to prevent certain abuses which
employment agencies had been known to commit from time to time, but
that the very nature of Manpower's operation precluded such abuses and
hence the desirability of this type of regulation. The court concluded:",
It is a legitimate business, performing a new type of service to
individuals and firms. In effect, it provides various types of serv-
ices, on a part-time basis, to customers who would not find it
practical to maintain a full-time service of that type in their
own concern. Reluctant as we are to interfere with an adminis-
trative interpretation of an act, we have the view that to uphold
that interpretation would be to extend the act by judicial fiat;
and this, we are not authorized to do.
b) Communication Workers Activity
Almost exactly two years ago, the Communication Workers of America
had concluded their strike against several telephone companies in the south
which extended over eight states, including Florida. The accompanying
legal activities were discussed at some length in the previous survey.1
This year, fortunately, the union-management contract was renegotiated
without difficulty and, consequently, there has been no legal activity within
this survey period.
However, during the month of September, 1957, there occurred a
nation-wide four-day18 walkout of a different branch of the Communication
Workers, namely, the Western Electric installation crews. The affected
15. FLA. STAT. § 449.01 (1955), quoted at page 198 of the Court's opinion.
16. 91 So.2d at 200.
17. 10 MIAMI LQ. 222-28.
IS. The actual dates were September 16 through September 19.
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locals immediately placed picket lines wherever installation work was in
progress, and, as a matter of policy, other units of the Communication
Workers (which includes virtually all crafts and non-supervisory occupations
in the telephone industry) refused to cross these lines. In spite of its
brevity, the strike was of major proportions in that, nation-wide, approx-
imately 200,000 workers were off their jobs.
This strike was marked, locally, by only one example of legal action.1
On the morning of September 16, picket lines were placed outside the site
of the nearly-completed Miami Daily News building because its telephone
equipment was being installed at that time. Despite its lack of completion,
the building nevertheless housed a substantial portion of the paper's pro-
duction facilities. The picketing had a rather explosive effect as far as
the Nes was concerned in that a large number of its employees unrelated
to the telephone industry or to the Communication Workers Union refused
to cross the lines. The production of the newspaper which had been com-
menced in the new building was resumed in the old building where presses
were still operable. Counsel filed suit on behalf of the News and the
general building contractor within a few hours asking for an injunction
against the picketing, and secured an emergency hearing for 4:00 o'clock
that afternoon. Upon notice of the suit and emergency hearing, the union
immediately offered to move its picket lines if the News would suspend
telephone installation work. This was agreed to, making further action in
the injunction suit unnecessary.
c) The Miami Beach Hotel Dispute
Litigation in the Florida Courts. Probably the most important devel-
opments in the field of Florida labor law have arisen from the determined
efforts of the Hotel Employees Union, Local 255 (A.F. of L.) to organize
the employees of the Miami Beach hotels, and the equally determined
efforts of certain hotels to resist such organization. Presently there is, of
course, no exercise of federal jurisdiction over hotel labor disputes,20 even
though the hotel industry engages in interstate commerce to a degree
ironically lacking in businesses thus held in landmark decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States.2' Needless to say, vigorous efforts
are being made by the Hotel Employees Union to end this continued
denial of federal jurisdiction.22
19. Miami Daily News, Inc. v. Local 3290, Communication Workers, CIO, W.
L. Edge, Jr., and Irwin K. Butts; Circuit Court (Dade County) case #205400.
20. See note 61, infra and the related text for further explanation.
21. E.g., (listed in order importance) Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Sunshine Anthracite Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1910);
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
22. These activities are discussed in the section of this article dealing with N.L.R.B.
iurisdiction at page 357.
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There had been considerable activity, legal and otherwise, in the hotel
dispute during the period covered by the previous survey, 231 and the reader
may refer thereto for detailed information. However, in order to make this
article coherent and to avoid repeated references to the preceding survey
for background material, we will at this time set forth a brief history of
the dispute and a condensed review of such legal proceedings as were
instituted prior to the period of the present survey. For convenience, the
parties will be referred to as "hotel" and "union" rather than plaintiff,
defendant, petitioner, respondent, etc., except where such designation is
desirable for the sake of clarity.
Shortly before April, 1955, the hotel employees' union embarked upon
an extensive organizational campaign among the personnel of the leading
Miami Beach hotels. The success of its efforts to recruit new members
has been and continues to be one of the most vigorously disputed matters,
in that much of the ensuing litigation has concerned whether or not a
majority of the employees at any particular hotel wished to be represented
by the union.
2 4
Twenty-two hotels ', were initially involved in litigation which, in each
instance, was precipitated when efforts of the union to institute negotiations
with these hotels remained fruitless, whereupon the union set up picket
lines and displayed "unfair" signs. The affected hotels immediately brought
suit to enjoin the picketing, contending that the union did not represent
a majority of their employees and that the picketing was allegedly for
an unlawful purpose, namely, to cause the management to enter into a
contract with the union designating it as the employees' exclusive bargaining
representative-so that the contract could be used to force individual
employees to join the union.26 The hotels sought temporary injunctions
against the picketing pending a final determination of the issues, but in
each case this relief was denied.
Counsel for eight of the hotels then petitioned the Supreme Court
of Florida for writs of certiorari to review the denial of the temporary
injunctions. The supreme court granted certiorari2 7 and held that it was
improper for the lower courts to have so denied the temporary injunctions.
The temporary injunctions were then entered, as a matter of course,
23. 10 MIAMi L.Q. 222-28.
24. As a matter of fact, this issue has been present, to some extent, in practically
all of the hotel cases, and was decisive in Thomas Jefferson, Inc. v. Hotel Employees
Union, AFL, which came before the supreme court on two occasions, 84 So.2d 583
(Fla. 1956); prior opinion, 81 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1955).
25. See note 31, infra.
26. So stated by the court in Boca Raton Club v. Hotel Employees Union, AFL,
83 So.2d 11, 16 (Fla. 1955).
27. Due to the manner in which the eight cases had been consolidated for appeal,
the supreme court handed down two separate opinions; Boca Raton Club v. Hotel
Employees Union, AFL, 80 So.2d 680 (Fla. 1955), with which five other cases were
consolidated, subsequent opinion, 83 So.2d 11 (Fla. 1955); Sax Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotel
Employees Union, AFL, 80 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1955).
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pursuant to the supreme court's mandate. Counsel for both sides thereupon
agreed to then proceed with but six of the twenty-two cases (hereafter
referred to as the Boca Raton cases) to avoid unnecessary multiplication
of trial work, the others to be held in abeyance. On final hearing before
the chancellors, the injunctions were dissolved. The hotels promptly applied
to the supreme court for supersedeas pending appeal of the final orders
of dissolution. Supersedeas was granted, and the injunctions were reinstated
pending disposition of the appeals. On appeal, the supreme court again
ruled in favor of hotels, 2 1 holding that the picketing was unlawful in that
it was: 2 1"
. . the unlawful use of economic pressure to coerce the petitioners
into negotiations with an alleged agent who failed and refused
as required by law and just dealing timely and appropriately to
establish his authority. Hence picketing is for an unlawful purpose
.... [Emphasis added]
The lower court orders dissolving the temporary injunctions were,
therefore, quashed.
At this point we enter the period covered by the present survey.
Counsel for the union had by this time, apparently, given up hope
of receiving approval of any favorable circuit court ruling by the Supreme
Court of Florida and had decided that the best plan would be to lay
the proper foundation, on the appropriate constitutional grounds,30 for
28. 83 So.2d at 16.
29. Ibid.
30. The free speech aspects of picketing continue to present close questions on
the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. A recent example is Youngdahl v.
Rainfair, Inc. 355 U.S. - (1957), where the Supreme Court of the United States was
called upon to review the constitutionality of a state court injunction against all picket-
ing where it was accompanied by numerous and severe acts of violence, offensive language
toward non-strikers, and similar conduct typical of certain labor unions. If there be any
doubt as to the fairness of this last remark, see (cited in order of significance): Milk-
wagon Drivers Union of Chicago v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941); Steiner
v. Longbeach Local 128 of Oil Workers International Union, 19 Cal.2d 676, 123 P.2d
20 (1942); Shiland v. Retail Clerks, Local 1657, 259 Ala. 277, 66 So.2d 146 (19531;
Smith v. F. & C. Engineering Co., 225 Ark. 688, 285 S.W.2d 100 (1956); Safeway
Stores v. Retail Clerks International Ass'n, 234 P.2d 678 (Cal. App. 1951), af'd, 41
Cal.2d 567, 261 P.2d 721 (1953); Godchaux Sugars, Inc. v. Chisson, 227 La. 146, 78
So.2d 673 (1955); \Vilkes Sportswear v. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union,
380 Pa. 164, 110 A.2d 418 (1955); General Electric Co. v. United Auto Vorkers' of
America, AFL, 8 I11. App.2d 154, 130 N.E.2d. 758 (1956).
The Court held that, unfortunately, while the state court acted within its powers
in enjoining the acts of violence and intimidation, it was " . . . equally clear that such
court entered the preempted domain of the National Labor Relations Board insofar as
it enjoined peaceful picketing by petitioners."
In the Youngdahl case, it should be noted, the National Labor Relations Board
admittedly had jurisdiction, and it is, therefore, sharply distinguishable from the Miami
Beach hotel cases.
For a recent article concerning this highly controversial subject see Forkosch,
An Analysis and Re-evaluation of Picketing in Labor Relations, 26 FOEDHAnM L. REV. 391
1957). See also Forkosch, Informational Representational and Organizational Picketing,
LB. L.J. 843 (1955); Forkosch, jurisdiction and Impact On State Powers, 16 Ono
ST. L.J. 30 (1955).
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review by the Supreme Court of the United States. Accordingly, final
orders were entered in all twenty-two cases pursuant to stipulation, and all
were consolidated for the purposes of appeal to the Supreme Court of
Florida. On March 15, 1957, the orders were affirmed in twenty-two per
curiam memorandum opinions.31 Surprisingly, the per curiam opinions were
not based upon the prior connected Boca Raton decisions3 2 as to the
affected hotels, but, in each case, the court recited that the affirmation
was grounded on Fontainbleau Hotel v. Hotel Employees Union, AFL,3 5
a suit concerning the Miami Beach hotel dispute, which had been prosecuted
independently of the original twenty-two cases and decided a mere six weeks
prior to their final disposition.
A discussion of the Vountainbieau decision is certainly necessary at
this point. As in the San Marino hotel case, 4 it appeared that the union
had placed pickets outside the entrances to the hotel following unsuccessful
attempts to institute negotiations with the hotel. The hotel filed suit
seeking a temporary restraining order against the picketing, pending a
determination of its legality, which order was thereupon issued. After
further proceedings before the chancellor, (the details of which were not
reported), the temporary restraining order was dissolved. The hotel thereupon
filed its petition for certiorari in the supreme court seeking to review and
quash the order of dissolution.
The supreme court, speaking through Justice Terrell, granted the
petition for certiorari and quashed the order of dissolution. The court
discussed the applicable law quite fully before arriving at its decision
and, as appears from the opinion, reviewed and reconsidered the evidence
(not merely the findings of the chancellor). There was no mention, it
31. Hotel Employees Union, AFL, v. Hotel Delmonico, 93 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1957);
Hotel Employees Union, AFL, v. Boca Raton Corp., 93 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1957); Hotel
Employees Union, AFL, v. Sea Isle Hotel, 93 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees
Union, AFL, v. Martinique Hotel, 93 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees Union,
AFL, v. Casa Blanca Operating Company, 93 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees
Union, AFL, v. Allenberg, 93 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees Union, AFL, v.
Levy, 93 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees Union, AFL, v. 2500 Collins Avenue
Corporation, 93 So.2d 598 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees Union, AFL, v. Monte Carlo,
93 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees Union, AFL, v. Biscayne Terrace Hotel, 93
So.2d 597 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees Union, AFL, v. Cohen, 93 So.2d 596 (Fla.
1957); Hotel Employees Union, AFL, v. Leevlans Corp., 93 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1957); Hotel
Employees Union, AFL, v. A. 11. S. Corporation, 93 So.2d 596 (Fla. 1957); Hotel
Employees Union, AFL, v. Stuyvesant Corporation, 93 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1957); Hotel
Employees Union, AFL, v. McAllister Hotel, 93 So.Zd 595 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees
Union, AFL, v. Di Lido Hotel, 93 So.2d 595 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees Union, AFL,
v. Sax Enterprises, Inc., 93 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees Union, AFL, v.
Lansburgh, 93 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1957); lotel Employees Union, AFL, v. Levy, 93 So.2d
583 (Fla. 1957); Hotel Employees Union, AFL, v. Sorrento Hotel, 93 So.2d 580 (Fla.
1957).
32. Boca Raton Club v. Hotel Employees Union, AFL, supra notes 27, 28.
33. 92 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1957).
34. Thomas Jefferson, Inc. v. Hotel Employees Union, AFL, 81 So.2d 731 (Fla.
1955). This case was discussed in the previous survey, 10 MIAMI L.Q. at 223, and an
account of the subsequent proceedings may be found at page 354.
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should be added, of the principle of law that an appellate court will not
disturb the findings of fact of a lower court sitting without a jury unless
they are clearly unsupported by the evidence.35 In this connection, it is
certainly not made clear whether, in the opinion of the supreme court,
the lower court arrived at findings of fact inconsistent with the evidence or
whether the court simply misconstrued the legal effect of such facts it
had properly determined from the evidence. Stated as briefly as possible,
the supreme court, after examining the record before it, found the following
state of affairs to have existed:
I. The picket lines were thrown up without any pre-cxisting "honest"-",
attempt to bring about negotiations between an authorized bargaining
agent of the employees and the employer to settle a bona-fide labor dispute. 7
2. The pickets had displayed a placard alleging that the hotel was
"unfair" but that there was "... little or no evidence to support the
truth of the legend . . . 8
3. There was evidence of intimidation on the part of the union
representatives toward the hotel employees, made in an attempt to impedc
them in going to work.39
4. The pickets were "not shown to have refrained" from abuse of
both employees and hotel patrons.40
5. Of the approximately 1,000 employees of the hotel only 200 had
designated the union as their bargaining agent at the time picketing
commenced.4
6. Both parties had exhibited bad faith, lack of mutual respect,
tension and an eagerness to haggle. 42
7. Only two of the pickets were employees of the hotel. 3
8. The picketing was for the primary purpose of forcing both the
hotel and the employees to recognize the union as the employees' authorized
bargaining representative 4
35. The Supreme Court of Florida has repeatedly and emphatically so held. See,
Holland v. Gross, 89 So.2d 255 (Fla. 1956); In re Thompson's Estate, 84 So.2d 911 (Fla.
1955); First Atlantic National Bank v. Cobett, 83 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1955); In re Balk-
ridge's Estate, 74 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1954); Foley Lumber Co. v. Koester, 61 So.2d 634
(Fla. 1953); Suttles v. Florida Real Estate Commission ex rel. O'Kelley, 139 Fla. 210,
197 So. 433 (1939); Parsons v. Federal Realty Corporation, 105 Fla. 105, 143 So. 912
(1932); Fisher v. Villamil, 65 Fla. 488, 62 So. 481 (1913).
36. 92 So.2d at 415.
37. Ibid.
38. 92 So.2d at 418.
39. Id. at 419.
40. Id. at 418.
41. Id.
42. Ibid.
43. Id. at 419.
44. Ibid.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
9. The picketing was accompanied by acts of violence or near-
violencC.
41
10. There was no bona-fide labor dispute.46
I1. The hotel had never been informed by the union about any pro-
posed subject for negotiation.47
12. The union did not, in fact, represent the employees of the hotel
as their bargaining agent.
4
It will be immediately seen that each of these twelve findings indicate
an express violation, on the part of the union, of the Florida Labor
Organizations Act, as previously construed by the supreme court.49
Specifically, the union had been found by the supreme court to have
violated section 447.09 (11) prohibiting coercion or intimidation of the
employees in the enjoyment of their legal rights, and section 447.09 (13)
prohibiting picketing by force, violence, or other than in a reasonable and
peaceable manner. It was for these reasons, the court said, that the order
of dissolution should be quashed.
The opinion is replete with language indicating that the court
regarded the union's conduct as most reprehensible, and at one point
the court stated:50
We are convinced that so much that the law requires as a pre-
requisite to picketing was ignored in this case that respondents are
entitled to no relief at the hands of this or any court . . .
[Emphasis added]
The court goes on to point out in two places the specific errors
committed below.
First, it appeared that the lower court misconstrued the language
used by the supreme court in the second Boca Raton 1 opinion wherein it
was stated that a union, before it could legally demand an employer to
45. Id. at 418.
46. Id. at 419, 420.
47. ibid.
48. Id.
49. International Typographical Union v. Ormerod, 59 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1952);
Hotel & Restaurant Employees, AFL, v. Cotbron, 59 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1952); Hetenbaugh
v. Airline Pilots Ass'n, 52 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1951); Stonaris v. Certain Picketers, 46 So.2d
387 (Fla. 1950); Local 519, United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of Plumbing
and Pipefitting Industry v. Robertson, 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950); Johnson v. White Swan
Laundry, 41 So.2d 874 (Fla. 1949); Moore v. City Dry Cleaners and Laundry, 41 So.2d
865 (Fla. 1949); Miami Laundry Co. v. Laundry Linen Union, 41 So.2d 305 (Fla.
1949); Whitehead v. Miami Laundry Co., 160 Fla. 667, 36 Sn.2d 382 (1948); Miami
Water Works, Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So.2d 194 (1946); Hill v.
State, 155 Fla. 245, 19 So.2d 857 rev'd, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), rehearing denied, 326
U. S. 804 (1945); Pittman v. Nix, 152 Fla. 378, 11 So.2d 791 (1943).
50. 92 So.2d at 420.
51. Boca Raton Club v. Hotel Employees Union, AFL, supra note 27.
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bargain with it, must represent "at least some of the employees.' 5 2 It
seems that the lower court thereby reasoned that as long as the union did
represent some of the employees, it had a legal right to engage in picketing.
Justice Terrell remarked:5 3
The reason for the expression "at least some of the employees"
was that in that case it was not shown that the union represented
any of the employees prior to the strike. The quoted expression
was a mere expletive of the situation before the court and has no
relevance to this case.
Second, the lower court "confused ' ' 4 the law governing picketing
and that governing the right to strike, and thereby erred when it dissolved
the injunction in the face of the facts presented before it. The supreme
court pointed out the distinction between the prerequisites to a legal strike
and the prerequisites to legal picketing; that is, a strike may not be con-
ducted unless approved by a majority of the employees, whereas no such
requirement pertains to picketing. 5 However, the court stated.5 6
It picketingl cannot be initiated, however, for spite or for reasons
other than to accomplish a lawful purpose and then the law,
order and decency require that it be done in an atmosphere
conducive to reaching a result that is fair to the employer, the
employees and the public. If attempted in an atmosphere of
violence, insinuation, bad faith, deception, farce or damned-if-I-
don't-show-you-spirit, it should not be recognized as a means of
adjusting labor disputes . . . Picketing conducted in such an
environment, as we stated in Sax Enterprises v. Hotel Employees
Union . . . is nothing more than a "species of coercion traveling
under the guise of free speech for the purpose of enjoying con-
stitutional immunity."
A new and important rule set forth in the ease is that individual
employees who may have a grievance against their employer are not
required to comply with the prerequisites to legal picketing set forth in
this and prior supreme court opinions, provided that the total number
of such employees does not exceed a majority.57
The court concluded by summarizing its specific holding as follows:58
. . . We hold merely that the union as such, and as distinguished
from the individual employees, may not, under the circumstances
presented here, engage in picketing by use of members of the
union as pickets who are not employees of the subject employer ...
52. Id. at 16.
53. 92 So.2d at 418.
54. Id. at 417.
55. FLA. STAT. § 447.09(3) (1957).
56. 92 So.2d at 418.
57. Id. at 420.
58. Ibid.
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Getting back to the twenty-two cases, it is difficult indeed to
understand why the supreme court affirmed the circuit court proceedings
on the basis of the Fountainbleau case, rather than on the two Boca Raton
cases.59 After all, it was the Boca Raton cases in which the previous circuit
court action was held improper, and the final circuit court proceedings
which inevitably terminated adversely to the union were likewise (and,
indeed, necessarily) based directly upon the Boca Raton decisions.
In any event, counsel for the union have now filed petitions in
the Supreme Court of the United States for writs of certiorari to review
the orders and rulings of the Supreme Court of Florida. The legal
"Questions Presented" which counsel for the union contend necessarily
invoke federal jurisdiction are set forth in the petition as follows: 0
1. Whether the Supreme Court of Florida may, consistently with
the Fourteenth Amendment as it has been applied by the United States
Supreme Court to the prohibition of peaceful picketing, embark upon
a course of decision plainly designed to prevent any picketing under any
circumstances by employees engaged in an attempt to achieve union
recognition and collective bargaining in the hotel industry.
2. Whether a state court may, consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibit any publication whatsoever of the fact that a strike
exists.
3. Whether Florida may, either by judicial action or by application
of its statutory law, prohibit peaceful picketing, and thus regulate labor
relations matters in an industry affecting commerce over which the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has refused to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Whether the Supreme Court of Florida, by repeatedly changing the
rules governing peaceful picketing during the course of the litigation,
deprived petitioners of due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
As this article goes to press, word has been just received that the
Supreme Court of the United States has granted the petitions for certiorari.
Another hotel case (unconnected with the twenty-two key cases) is
Thomas Jefferson, Inc. v. Hotel Employees Union, AFL,61 which came
before the Florida Supreme Court, on petition for certiorari, for the second
time.
A brief review of the facts is appropriate at this point. As usual, the
union had placed pickets around the hotel following an impasse in
59. See note 27, 28 supra.
60. The author gratefully acknowledges counsel for the Hotel Employees Union,
I. Carrington Gramling, Esq., for making available copies of these petitions and for
furnishing much additional helpful information.
61. 84 So.2d 583 (Fla. 1956).
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attempted negotiations between the representatives of the union and
the hotel.
The hotel thereupon filed suit in circuit court for injunction against
the picketing, contending that such picketing was unlawful in that its
purpose was to compel the hotel management to designate the union as the
employees' sole bargaining representative and to thus force them to join
the union as a prerequisite to representation, even though the union did
not, allegedly, represent a majority of the employees.
62
In order to determine whether or not the union did so represent a
proper majority, the chancellor appointed a special "commissioner"63 to
conduct an election by secret ballot. Picketing was enjoined in the mean-
time. The hotel petitioned the supreme court for certiorari to review this
order, whereupon the chancellor granted supersedeas (or, in effect, a
vacation) both as to the order directing an election and the injunction
against the picketing. The supreme court, in its first opinion, held that it
was error for the chancellor to have superseded the injunction against
picketing until its legality had been determined and, accordingly, reversed
and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The second case arose when, during the ensuing circuit court pro-
ceedings, the hotel again petitioned the supreme court for certiorari, this
time challenging the propriety of any court-supervised secret election.
The court again ruled in favor of the hotel, holding that such a court-
supervised election was not a proper exercise of equity jurisdiction. More
specifically, the court pointed out that it:65
. . . obviously deprives both parties of the established right of
cross-examination and the confronting of witnesses as well as the
compelling of witnesses to testify under oath . . .
To go into more detail, it appeared that counsel for the hotel had
introduced into evidence exhibits which indicated that twenty of its
twenty-nine employees were within the job classifications sought to be
unionized. Counsel for the union had, in turn, introduced into evidence
a number of cards purportedly signed by certain employees designating
the union as their bargaining representative. Other evidence introduced on
behalf of the hotel indicated that only three of the affected employees
had actually made such a designation. This, said the court: 6
. . . shifted to the respondent [union] the burden of going forward
with the evidence to establish that it was in fact the authorized
62. 81 So.2d at 732.
63. [bid.
64. Thomas Jefferson, Inc. v. Hotel Employees Union, AFL, 81 So.2d 731 (Fla.
1955).
65. 84 So.2d at 585.
66. Id. at 584.
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representative of the employees . . . Each party doubts the other's
records but on this appeal neither party has cited to this court
any authority for the appointment of a commissioner to hold an
extra-legal secret ballot in order to produce evidence for the
consideration of the court in a matter pending in litigation before
it . .. .
Thus, the court, in effect, held that the factual issue before the
chancellor (i.e., whether or not a majority of the employees wished the
union to represent them) should have been resolved by ordinary legal
procedure, such as the introduction of evidence, production or subpoena
of documents, testimony of the employees and other "traditional equity
procedures."'"
The court disposed of the one remaining objection raised by the
union, namely, that the inherent lack of secrecy in ordinary equity pro-
ceedings would expose the employees to discrimination, by pointing out
that the union itself had already divulged the names of its supporters
when it submitted the signed cards as exhibits to be examined by opposing
counsel and placed in the court file as a public record.
The decision, however legally and technically unassailable, offers scant
encouragement to those who seek an orderly settlement of labor disputes.
While the need for secrecy perhaps appears to have been vitiated in the
instant case, there is but little doubt that such secrecy is a well-established
principle of labor law.05 In this connection it is significant to note that
the Florida Labor Organization Act itself provides for an employee vote69
by secret ballot 70 before a strike (as distinguished from picketing) may
be conducted. It is further apparent that the determination of the union's
majority status by eliciting testimony of individual employees would be
wholly unworkable where a large number of employees are within the
group sought to be unionized. In the Fountainbleau Hotel case,7 ' for example,
it appears that approximately one thousand employees might very well be
called upon to give testimony. According to one source, 72 the Miami Beach
hotel industry, as a whole, employs approximately 12,000 people. The
implication in the supreme court's decision that even a fraction of this
number might be required to parade through circuit court hearings to be
subjected to direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross-examination does violence
to reason. It is to be hoped that the newly established mediation and
67. Ibid.
68. Section 9(c) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. 159 (1952) specifically provides for the certification of an
authorized bargaining agent by secret ballot in industries within the jurisdiction of the
N.L.R.B. A similar requirement appears in the labor legislation of several states. Eg., New
York, Michigan and Wisconsin.
69. FLA. STAT. § 447-09(3) (1957
70. FLA. STAT. § 447-09(4) (1957.
71. See note 33 supra.
72. Bureau of Economic Research, University of Miami.
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conciliation service 73 will provide suitable machinery for the conduct of
employee elections so that the frustrating effect of the Thomas Jefferson
decision will thus be overcome.
N.L.R.B. Jurisdiction. From the very inception of the Miami Beach
hotel dispute the union has been waging war on two fronts, so to speak.
In addition to prosecuting such remedies as might have been afforded in
the state courts, the union has been engaged in vigorous efforts to persuade
the National Labor Relations Board to assume jurisdiction over the
dispute. The major obstacle in the path of the union has been that
its efforts, in order to be successful, necessarily require a complete reversal
of the long-established policy of the National Labor Relations Board to
decline jurisdiction over hotel disputes.74 Certainly, this change in policy
could not be casually made since the additional work thereby thrust on
the Board and its regional offices nation-wide would undoubtedly have a
stunning impact on the organization.
At the conclusion, of the period covered by the preceding Survey, the
union had exhausted its efforts both at the regional level and before the
full Board which, on August 26, 1955, dismissed the union's petition seeking
to invoke N.L.R.B. jurisdiction. These proceedings were documented and
discussed in the previous survey and the reader is referred thereto 5 for
further details.
During the period covered by the present survey, the union has been
prosecuting its appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit to review the adverse ruling of the Board.
As this article goes to press, we have received word that the court
affirmed the Board's position in two-to-one split, Haywood, J. dissenting.
Unfortunately, the court's opinion has not appeared in printed form so
we are not able at this time to comment further upon the significance of
this decision.
Circuit Court Activity. A circuit court decision also concerning the
Miami Beach hotel strike appears in the Florida Supplement, namely,
International Company v. Hotel Employees Union, AFL.76 The facts
are strikingly similar to those in the Fountainbleau Hotel77 case. The court,
Carroll, J., made specific findings of fact which, briefly summarized, are
as follows. After the refusal of the hotel to recognize the union as a bargain-
ing representative, pickets assembled around the entrance to the hotel, and,
so the court found, engaged in a number of unwholesome activities, to-wit:
name-calling, cursing, threats, psychological intimidation of various kinds
73. FLA. STAT. § 448.06 (1957).
74. Virgin Isles Hotel, Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 558 (1954); Hotel Ass'n of St. Louis,
92 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1951); White Sulphur Springs Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1949).
75. 10 MIAMI L.Q. 225- 228.
76. 7 Fla. Supp. 164 (1955), aff'd without opinion, 93 So.2d 898 (Fla. 1956).
77. See note 33 supra.
358 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
together with actual violence78 Further, the court found that a majority
of the employees had not, in fact, designated the union as their bargaining
agent, and that the purpose of the picketing was to force the hotel to
recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees,79
irrespective of its true status.
In a well reasoned opinion, the court held,
1. That the pickets had indulged in force and violence to the point
where their conduct could not be held privileged under the constitutional
guarantees of free speech.
2. That the strike was illegal in that it was not authorized by a
majority vote of the employees to be governed thereby, and thus clearly
within the prohibition of well-settled Florida law.
Accordingly, the court entered its injunction against the picketing on
the basis of the authorities cited.80
FEDERAL DECISIONS
Because the federal decisions of local interest within this survey period
do not fall into any particular pattern, each will be discussed individually.
Sigfred v. Pan American World Airwayssl concerns the interpretation
of certain provisions of a collective bargaining agreement between the Air
Line Pilots Association International and Pan American World Airways.
It also deals with some interesting collateral issues concerning federal labor
jurisdiction and the applicability of Florida law where federal jurisdiction
is invoked. The provision in the agreement which gave rise to the controversy
was as follows:1
2
The company will provide or compensate the pilot for the cost
of complete medical care for occupational sickness or injury. In
78. 7 Fla. Supp. at 166:
: , . the court is inclined to the view that defendants or pickets were respons-
ible for the fights, in the main, for two reasons-(1) because there was a
general practice among the pickets and those working with them to curse the
employees and to call them names which usually bring on a fight, and (2)
because defendants' contention against violence is inconsistent with the
grouping of off-duty pickets and other persons in cars or on bus-stop corners
nearby, occasional threats "to get" an employee within his hearing and fol-
lowing an employee's car after such a threat, the photographing of employees
entering or leaving the premises, and picketing in a manner to hinder, if not
actually obstruct, passage of persons and vehicles at times at entranceways
or driveways, all of which I find to have been present to some substantial
degree.
79. 7 Fla. Supp. at 168.
80. Treasure, Inc. v. Iotel and Restaurant Employees Union, AFL, 72 So.2d 670
(Fa. 1954); Miami Typographical Union v. Ormerod, 61 So2d 753 (Fla. 1952); Local
519 United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of Plumbing and Pipe Fitting
Industry v. Robertson, 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
81. 230 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956).
82. Id. at 17.
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the event of non-occupational injury or illness occurring while on
assignment at a point other than the pilot's base station, or outside
the Continental United States, the company agrees to reimburse
the pilot for such additional expenses occasioned by the pilot's
location at the time of such injury or illness. During such period
the pilot's salary will be continued and the pilot agrees that all
workmen's compensation benefits due under applicable laws shall
be paid by the pilot to the company.
The plaintiff pilot, Sigfred, had incurred an ear injury which caused
him dizziness during flight and which, after unsuccessful treatment, ren-
dered him totally unfit to continue his duties, according to his employer.
There being no other suitable employment available at Pan American for
which Sigfred would be nevertheless qualified, Pan American discharged
him. Sigfred thereupon embarked upon a tortuous legal path to determine
his rights.
Sigfred first brought suit for declaratory decree as to his rights under
the collective bargaining agreement in the local circuit court. Pan American,
asserting federal jurisdiction, removed the case to the appropriate United
States District Court. It was Sigfred's contention that, under the terms of
the agreement, he was entitled to receive full salary during the entire
duration of his disability ailment, for life if necessary, since the last
sentence of the above-quoted portion of the agreement should be applied
to the first sentence as well as to the second sentence. Such an interpretation
would indeed provide Sigfred with his full salary for the entire duration
of his permanent disability.
The federal court dismissed Sigfred's complaint without prejudice, on
the grounds that lie had not exhausted his administrative remedies under
the Railway Labor Act. 3
Sigfred next'applied for state workmen's compensation and was
awarded a determination by the Florida Industrial Commission that his
disability was, in fact, caused by an occupational injury. Armed with this
determination Sigfrcd again approached Pan American and was thereupon
denied liability in excess of that arising from workmen's compensation. In
compliance with the termis of the collective bargaining agreement, the
company's action was next reviewed before the Pilot's System Board of
Adjustment, but again Sigfred was unsuccessful.
Obviously a man not to be easily defeated, Sigfred then brought
another suit in the district court challenging the Board's interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement. Once more Sigfred lost, but undaunted
by adversity, lie appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, which was equally unsympathetic, although Sigfred did receive
the consolation of a very elaborate dissenting opinion by Circuit judge
Brown.
83. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1952).
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The court summed up the position taken by Sigfred in the following
language:
84
... Sigfred contends that his election to pursue his remedy to
the Pilots' System Board of Adjustment was not voluntary, but
pursuant to Florida law; that Florida law governs the reviewability
of the Board's award; that under the Florida rule of reviewability
of arbitration awards, all pure questions of law may reexamined
by the reviewing court, and that a consideration of the board's
interpretation of the agreement will reveal it to be patently
erroneous ...
The court disposed of these contentions by holding:
1. That Florida law had no application:
Congress having required the negotiation of collective bargaining
agreements, and the establishment of boards of adjustment to inter-
pret them, we deem it a reasonable-corollary thereto that it intended
that the scope of review in appeals from these boards should be
determined by federal courts, applying federal law ...
2. Under federal law"5 Sigred's grievance had been properly adjudi-
cated by the Board of Adjustment and that the decision of the board
was final and binding.
3. That it was not within the province of the court to review a
challenged ruling of the board: s8
...there being no question raised regarding the jurisdiction of
the board or the regularity of its proceedings ...
4. That, in any event, the interpretation placed by the board upon
the disputed section of the agreement was not only reasonable but
"entirely correct,"87  that Sigfred's interpretation would amount to an
implausibly generous guaranteed salary for life in the event of permanent
disability, and that had the parties desired such a provision it would
have been easy to word the agreement accordingly rather than to force
an interpretation to that effect in the manner suggested by Sigfred. 8
84. So-called from Moore v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941) (which
allowed employee treating employment at an end to sue for wrongful discharge, the
Railway Labor Act, as such, not requiring pursuit of remedy before Railway Adjustment
Board); and Slocum v. Delaware LAW. R. R., 339 U.S. 239 (1950) (Railway Adjust-
ment Board is invested with exclusive iurisdiction to determine dispute or grievances
concerning interpretation or application of contract in non-Moore situations). Any at-
tempt to compress Judge Brown's legal analysis into a reasonably compact form would,
we are quite sure, do violence to his reasoning. It is indeed unfortunate that a full dis-
cussion of his well-considered dissent is far beyond the scope of this article.
85. 49 STAT. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-185 (1952).
86. 230 F.2d at 17. Cf., Bower v. Eastern Airlines, 214 F.2d 623 (3rd Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 871 (1954).
87. Ibid.




Circuit Judge Brown, in a twelve-page dissent 9 supported by volumin-
ous footnotes, took issue with his associates on a number of grounds, both
legal and factual. He stated that, in his opinion, the problem before the
court was highly complex. In the judge's own words: 90
In our task, as I view it, we cannot reach the merits, to approve
or disapprove the holding unless there were a justiciable case before
the district court. We are forced, and ought therefore, to examine
into the complex field of the availabilty, use, exhaustion and finality
of any existing administrative remedies . . . This involves this
further process: Was Sigfred's claim a Moore or Slocum case?84
If Moore: (a) Did Florida law require him to exhaust the
administrative remedies under collective bargaining contract and
System Board of Adjustment, if so, was the adverse award by
Board binding at all, and by what standards, State or Federal,
is this to be determined? (b) If exhaustion of remedies was not
required, was his pursuit of them voluntary; and, if so, is he bound;
if not, what is the extent of the review and by what standards,
State or Federal, is it to be determined? If Slocum: (a) Is the
award reviewable by the terms of the Statute Railway Labor Act?
(b) If not, must a right of review be implied, and if so, what is
the extent of the review?
In his dissent, Judge Brown resolved these questions in favor of
the position taken by Sigfred,9 1 and concluded that the Adjustment Board's
decision should have been judicially reviewed.9 2 Judge Brown rounded off
his dissent with an analysis of the disputed contract provision and con-
eluded that Sigfred's interpretation was correctY3
In the previous survey, Budd Y. Mitchell94 was briefly discussed 5 as a
case of local interest arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act. It has
since taken on somewhat greater significance in that, on petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, the high court
granted certiorari, reversed98 the court of appeals, and affirmed the judgment
of the district court. It will be recalled that the case concerned coverage
by the Fair Labor Standards Act97 of employees of tobacco packing houses.
The court of appeals had held 8 the employees to be exempt from the
provisions of the act by virtue of section 13(a)(6)99 which provides that
89. 230 F.2d at 19.
90. Id. at 22.
91. Id. at 28.
92. Id. at 30.
93. Id. at 29.
94. 221 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1955) reversing Durkin v. Budd, 114 F. Supp. 865
(N.D. Fla. 1953).
95. 10 MIAMI L.Q. at 232.
96. Mitchell v. Budd, 350 U.S. 473 (1956).
97. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1952).
98. Budd v. Mitchell, supra note 94.
99. 63 STAT. 918 (1952), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) 1952, which reads as follows:
[exempt from the act is] any employee employed in agriculture or in con-
nection with the operation or maintenance of ditches, canals, reservoirs, or
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agricultural'0 0 employees do not fall within its coverage, and that employees
engaged in the preparation of agricultural goods for market (such as the
tobacco house workers) are deemed to be agricultural employees. The work
performed in the packing house, the court of appeals reasoned, constituted
"preparation for market."
The Supreme Court of the United States, pursuant to its dedicated
if questionable task of relentlessly extending federal jurisdiction, reversed
the court of appeals on typically spurious and illogical grounds. The Court
held that employees were not agricultural employees because:
1) . . . tobacco farmers do not ordinarily perform the bulking
operation ... 101
2).. . . the bulking operation is a process which changes the
natural state of the freshly cured tobacco as significantly as
milling changes sugar cane...102
The fallacy in this decision is that it should make no difference
whether or not tobacco farmers "ordinarily" perform such work if the
workers were actually engaged in agriculture. Admittedly, the nature of
the work' 013 performed by the tobacco house workers (i.e., "bulking")
poses a question of fact as to whether or not such work constitutes
"agriculture" as defined by the act, but it appears that the reasoning of
the court of appeals in determining this issue reveals a wisdom and
accuracy unfortunately, but typically, lacking in that of the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Amalgamated Association of Street Electric Ry. Employees, Division
1326 v. Greyhound Corporation0"4 is another interesting case wherein a
waterways, not owned or operated for profit, or operated on a share-crop
basis, and which are used exclusively for supply and storing of water for agri-
cultural purposes . . .
100. "Agriculture" is defined by Section 3(f) as follows:
. . . farming in all its branches and among other things includes the cultiva-
tion and tillage of the soil . . . and any practices . . . performed by a
farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming
operations, including preparation for market, delivery to storage or to market
or to carriers for transportation to market.
101. 350 U.S. at 481.
102. Ibid.
103. Details of the actual work performed are set forth in the opinion of the court
of appeals, where it is stated (221 F.2d at 409):
It (the tobacco] is then taken from the barns in the field, placed in appro-
priate containers and carried to the packing house where it is placed in piles
known as "bulks" for curing. Each bulk consists of more than 3,000 lbs.
of tobacco. The packing houses are equipped with machinery for the appro-
priate humidification and curing of the tobacco. During the curing period
the temperature within each bulk is closely watched from day to day and at
regular intervals, when the appropriate time has arrived, the bulk is broken
up, the tobacco leaves shaken out and those on the outside placed on the
inside of the new bulk, and those on the inside placed on the outside for
further curing. This process is continued until the tobacco is ready for mar-
ket when it is bailed (sic) for shipment.
104. 231 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1956).
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federal court interpreted the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement,
and, in doing so, applied Florida law. The suit arose when the employer
discharged its janitorial staff at the Jacksonville Bus Depot and arranged for
its services to be performed by an independent contractor known as
Floors, Inc. The union protested, taking the position that the discharge
was a breach of their collective bargaining agreement, that it was thereby
released from its no-strike clause, and that it was justified in threatening
the company with a strike. The company thereupon brought an action
for declaratory decree in the United States District Court to determine
its rights under the collective bargaining agreement, postponed the proposed
layoff and the commencement of the proposed services of Floors, Inc.,
pending the outcome of the suit.
The collective bargaining agreement itself was silent as to the actual
question before the court. It provided for seniority rights in case of a
reduction in personnel but did not specify one way or the other the rights
of the union or the company in reducing or disposing of personnel in any
particular job classification. After a number of hearings, the lower court
entered summary judgment in favor of the company, and the union appealed.
On appeal, the union contended that the contract reference to a
reduction in personnel should not imply justification for a total elimination
of a class of personnel since such an interpretation would contemplate a
complete destruction of the subject matter of the contract.
They argued further, that when two parties enter into an agreement
setting forth certain rights and duties, there is an implied collateral agree-
ment that neither will do anything to interfere with the exercise of such
rights.
The company, on the other hand, argued that its right to sub-contract
wdrk is inherent in that it concerns the management policy of the company
and that, in any event, the company is entitled to determine how it will
run its business.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment rendered below stating: 105
In prior rulings on the question, the cases are heavily on manage-
ment's side. It is settled Florida law that if an employer dis-
continues a part of his business he is under no duty to pay wages
to those workers left jobless by the change . . . However, other
cases more directly in point with the instant situation hold that
the type of limitation on management's freedom of operation
urged here will not be implied merely from the fact that the
parties agreed on terms and conditions covering the jobs in
question . . .
The court specifically declined to rule on the "inherent rights" theory
propounded by the employer because, the court said, the matter can be
disposed of by simply considering the legal effect of the contract's silence
105. Id. at 586.
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as to the matters in question, and that "in the absence of such a term,
we must regard the company's contract with Floors, Inc. as no breach
of its collective bargaining agreement with the union ....",,1o
Two cases of interest are National Labor Relations Board v. DuVal
Jewelry Co." 7 and the companion case (reversing it) bearing the same
name. The mdtter came before the district judge when the National
Labor Relations Board sought to enforce compliance with subpoenas issued
by the board in connection with a representation dispute. By statute'08
the board is empowered to issue subpoenas "upon application of any party"
and the United States District Courts are given jurisdiction to enforce
compliance with such subpoenas by contempt procedure. Pursuant to this
statute, the board had issued subpoenas requiring the production of certain
books and records.
This statute, however, must be read in conjunction with the N.L.R.B.
Rules and Regulations0 9 which provide that the Regional Director is to
be considered as a party to all proceedings in which it becomes involved.
The district court, Choate, J., quashed the subpoenas on two grounds.
First, the court ruled that the subpoenas were unreasonable, burdensome
and oppressive, in that they called for the production of voluminous
records on ten days notice at a point some 350 miles from their usual
location. The court said: 10
106. Id. at 587. The court relied on Division 1344 of Amalgamated Ass'n of Street
Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Tampa Elec. Co., 47 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1950).
The authorities cited by the court in support of this holding were International Long-
shoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Inland Waterways Corporation, 213 La.
670, 35 So.2d 425 (1948) (collective bargaining agreement prohibiting the discontin-
uance of established positions and the creation of new ones under a different title for
the purpose of reducing pay rate and evading seniority rules, held not to restrict the
employer's right to discontinue employment of any particular worker and to have such
work performed by an independent contractor), Local 600, United Automobile Workers,
CIO, v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Mich. 1953) (collective bargaining
agreement which purported to comprise entirety of agreement and contained express
provision for unequivocally vesting in the employer the right to manage its business, gave
employees no cause of action against employer who decentralized its operations neces-
sitating discharge of certain employees).
107. 141 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Fla. 1956), rev'd, 243 F.2d 427 (5th Cir.1957).
108. 49 STAT. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1952) the pertinent
portion of which reads as follows:
The Board or any member thereof, shall upon application of any party to
such proceedings, forthwith issue to such party subpenas requiring the attend-
ance and testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence in such
proceeding or investigation requested in such application . . . any district
court . .. . shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring
such person to appear before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, there
to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the
matter under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such
order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.
109. 29 C.F.R. § 102.58(e).
110. 141 F. Supp. at 861.
The term "party" as used in this part shall mean the regional director in
whose region the proceeding is pending, and any person named or admitted
as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as
a party, in any board proceedings ...
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•.. subpoenas duces tecum requiring the production of books and
records essential in the operation of a business should provide
ample time for the business to prepare for the absence of those
books and records ...
Second, the court was of the opinion that the board had exceeded
its authority by issuing1 ' the regulation which designated its Regional
Directors as "parties" in labor-management disputes. The court remarked: 11 2
.,. Inasmuch as the subpoenas in question were not issued upon
application of a party to the representation proceedings before
the National Labor Relations Board hearing officer, those subpoenas
were not, in my opinion, issued according to law and should be
quashed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
ruling of the district court, but for somewhat different reasons than those
set forth in the lower court's opinion. Additional facts appear in the
court of appeals opinion, namely, that one of the subpoenas was a subpoena
ad testificandum while the others were all subpoenas duces tecum. The
court also called attention to the fact that all of the respondents had filed
with the board petitions to revoke the subpoenas, accompanied by requests
for permission to file briefs and to present supporting oral argument, in
accordance with other statutory provisions, 1 but that the board had
refused to consider these petitions, contending that it was not required
to do so under board regulations." 4 The hearing officer had denied the
111. To quote from the opinion, 141 F. Supp. at 861:
The National Labor Relations Board . ..attempts to originate a new con-
cept in Anglo-American jurisprudence by attempting to make its Regional
Directors a "party" in all proceedings in their respective regions. Congress
nowhere has given the Board the power to enlarge by rule-making the clear-
meaning terms employed in the statute in question, nor does the statute con-
template any "Board" actions except to enforce the Boards findings. No-
where in the Common Law is there any basis for a construction of the word"party" to include persons directly associated with the "disintejested" trib-
unal before which tribunal both sides (here union and management) in an
adversary proceeding are submitting, or are about to submit, their causes.
112. 141 F. Supp. at 862.
113. 49 STAT. 455 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1) (1952):
Within five days after the service of a subpoena on any person requiring the
production of any evidence in his possession or under his control, such per-
son may petition the Board to revoke, and the Board shall revoke, such sub-
poena if in its opinion the evidence whose production is required does not
relate to any matter under investigation, or any matter in question in such
proceedings, or if in its opinion such subpoena does not describe with suffi-
cient particularity the evidence whose production is required ....
114. 29 C.F.R. § 102.58(c), Applications for Subpenas, provides:
. applications for subpoenas may be filed in writing by any party with
the regional director if made prior to hearing, or with the hearing officer,
if made at the hearing. Applications for subpoenas may be made ex parte.
The regional director or the hearing officer, as the case may be, shall forth-
with grant the subpoenas requested. Any person subpoenaed, if he does not
intend to comply with the subpoena, shall, within 5 days after the date of the
service of the subpoena, petition in writing to revoke the subpoena . - . the
regional director or the hearing officer as the case may be, shall revoke the
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petitions but the respondents had not sought appeal from his ruling to
the board as provided in other sections of the board's regulations. 15
Since thc act specifically provides a procedure to revoke such subpoenas
upon application to the board, rather than to the hearing officer, his action
in denying the petitions was held to be a nullity. Based on the foregoing,
the court held that reversible error had been committed as to the subpoenas
duces tecum in that the respondents had not exhausted their administrative
remedies prior to bringing their action in the district court.
The court, however, arrived at a different conclusion regarding the
subpoena ad testificandum since there is no provision, either in the act
or in the board's regulations, for revocation of such a subpoena. The court
further had to decide whether or not the subpoenas were effective in that
they were not sought by a "party" within the meaning of the act, as the
lower court had ruled. While the court did not specifically decide whether
or not the director was, technically speaking, a "party," it held that there
was no reason why the regional director should not, of his own motion,
issue such subpoenas:116
. . . we can see no objection to the board member furnishing the
subpoenas under his signature to the Regional Director in such
investigations as required. We think that the district court erred
in declining to enforce the subpoena ad testificandum directed to
Oliver Jenkins, and in not declining to rule upon the enforcement
of the subpoenas duces tecum...
LzcrsLATvE ENAcTmENTs
The 1957 Legislature enacted four measures of interest to Florida
labor lawyers.
Mediation and Conciliation Service.
The most significant legislative enactment is the addition of Section
448.06 to the Florida Labor Organization Act. It establishes a voluntary
mediation and conciliation service for the settlement of labor-management
disputes, under the jurisdiction of the governor. The governor has wide
powers indeed with respect to operation of the new service: 1
Such service shall be under the jurisdiction of the governor
wio is authorized to appoint, prescribe the duties, title, and fix
subpoena if, in his opinion, the evidence whose the production is required
does not relate to any matter under investigation in the proceedings or the
subpoena does not describe with sufficient particularly the evidence whose
production is required . . .
115. 29 C.F.R. § 102.57(c):
Unless expressly authorized by these rules and regulations in this part,
rulings by the regional director and by the hearing officer shall not be
appealed directly to the Board except by special permission of the Board,
but shall be considered by the Board when it reviews the entire record.
116. 243 F.2d at 431.
117. FLA. STAT. § 448.06(1) (1957).
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the salary of one full-time mediator or conciliator and such addi-
tional personnel as, in the discretion of the governor, may be
required.
However, it will be seen that the powers of the governor, while broad,
are lacking in coercive force as to the parties themselves: 1
The governor, by and through the mediation and conciliation
service, is hereby authorized and directed to promote, assist, and
encourage maintenance of mutually satisfactory employer-employee
relationships within the state, and, upon requests of any bona fide
party to a labor dispute or in the event of an existing or imminent
work stoppage, to proffer services and assistance to both parties •
in an effort to effect a voluntary, amicable, and expeditious adjust-
ment and settlement of the differences and issues which precipi-
tated or culminated in or which threaten to precipitate or cul-
minate in such labor dispute.
To facilitate efficiency and impartiality of the mediation service, the
act provides that all proceedings before and communications with the
Service are privileged and immune from disclosure to any administrative
or judicial tribunal.
The act is so new (effective as of July 1, 1957) that, as this article
goes to press, it is,-of course, not possible to attemptt to evaluate its
effectiveness.
Child Labor Law.
The legislature passed a number of amendments to Chapter 450,
Florida Statutes relating to Child Labor.
The changes may be briefly summarized as follows:
(a) Domestic or home work is no longer exempted from the act
if it is hazardous. 119
(b) The age below which a minor may not engage in any kind of
gainful employment has been raised from 10 to 12 years. 120
(c) The age below which a minor may not work durihg school hours
(subject to certain exceptions) has been raised from 14 to 16.121
(d) The age below which a boy may not engage in a street trade
(shining shoes, selling newspapers, etc.) has been raised from 10 to 12
118. FLA. STAT. § 448.06(3) (1957). The reader is referred to the report prepared
by lames Etheridge, Jr., Esq., of the Florida Industrial Commission entitled "A Study
of the Advisability of Establishing a Voluntary State Conciliation & Mediation Service
in Florida to Promote the Continuation of Harmonious Labor-Management Relations."
119. FLA. STAT. § 450.011 (1957).
120. FLA. STAT. § 450.021 (1957).
121. Ibid.
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and the age below which a girl may not engage in such trade has been
lowered from 18 to 16.122
(e) The age below which a girl may not be employed as a messenger
who delivers goods or messages has been lowered from 18 to 16. In its
previous form, the act prohibited work as ". . . a messenger for telegraph,
telephone, and the messenger companies in the distribution, transmission,
or delivery of goods or messages . . ." As amended, the act does not in
alny way describe or limit the type of business in which such work is
prohibited.1
21
(f) Minors under 16 years are prohibited from employment in alligator
wrestling, snake pit work, or "similar hazardous activities. 124
(g) An entirely different formula for the determination of the maximum
hours of employment of minors under 16 has been promulgated. Among
other things, the act now relates the permissible hours of night-time em-
ployment to the necessity for attendance of school on the following day.12
(h) The phrase "restrooms and toilet facilities" has been substituted
for "washrooms and water closets" in the section relating to such facilities.12 0
(i) The requirement that copies of employment certificates be sent
to the Industrial Commission through the State Superintendent has been
eliminated.
121
(j) The provision that the Industrial Commission may waive certain
provisions of the Child Labor Law has been amended to specifically authorize
such waiver upon the recommendation of a juvenile court having jurisdiction
of the minor.
1 28
(k) Section 450.131 has been, understandably, repealed.12
Public Works Wages Law.
122. FLA. STAT. § 450.031 (1957).
123. FLA. STAT. § 450.041 (1957)
124. FLA. STAT. § 450.061 (1957
125. FLA. STAT. § 450.081 (1957)
126. FLA. STAT. § 450.091(1) (1957).
127. FLA. STAT. § 450.111(3) (1957).
128. FA. STAT. § 450.111(4) (1957).
129. Laws of Fla. c. 57-224(10) (1957), effective July 1, 1957. The repealed sec-
tion provided:
Whoever hires or employs or causes to be hired or employed any minor,
knowing such minor to be under the age of fifteen years, and under the
legal control of another, without the consent of those having such legal con-
trol, for more than sixty days, shall be punished by imprisonment not ex-
ceeding sixty days or by fine not exceeding $20.00.
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Sections 215.19(3) (a) and (b), Florida Statutes, 30 relating to minimum
legal wages and basic labor conditions on public works projects been
extensively supplemented and amended. As previously worded, these sections
merely provided for "investigation" by the commission in the event of an
alleged violation, to be followed by a "decision based thereon." As amended,
there is now provided a detailed procedure whereby an aggrieved employee
may notify the public authority by affidavit, and upon receipt of such
affidavit, the authority must withhold the disputed amount from the con-
tractor until the merits of the dispute are determined.
Arbitration.
The 1957 Florida Legislature has made a complete reform of the
Florida arbitration act, (or "Florida Arbitration Code," as it is now
called.) 131 The new sections provide first (and most important) of all,
that parties to a contract may incorporate into their agreement a com-
pulsory arbitration provision and that such provision ". . . shall be valid,
enforceable and irrevocable without regard to the justiciable character of
the controversy ...,,13 The act, as amended, further sets forth an arbitration
procedure in considerable detail, with specific provisions for compulsion8 s
and stay' 8' of arbitration, appointment of arbitrators by court order,18 5
rendition of award, 36 change of award, 137 confirmation, 3 8 modification,1 9
or vacation" 0 of an award, entry of judgment or decree on an award,' 4'
and for appeals therefrom. 142
The code is entitled "An Act Relating to Commercial Arbitration"
though the word "Commercial" does not appear in the text of the statute
itself. It seems quite probable that a question will be raised, sooner or
130. The 1955 version was relatively short and provided:
In case of a dispute regarding payment of the prevailing rate of wages of
employees in any of the several classifications which the contracting author-
ity is unable to settle, the matter shall be referred to the Florida Industrial
Commission for determination. In all cases the Commission may make such
investigation as it may deem necessary. The decision of the Commission
shall be conclusive upon all parties, subject to iudicial review.
131. FLA. STAT. §§ 57.10- 57.31 (1957). The reader is referred to the Contracts
Survey for a comprehensive discussion of the new Arbitration Code. See also: Stem and
Troetschel, The Role of Modem Arbitration in the Progressive Development of Florida
Law, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 205 (1953); Yonge, Arbitration of an Ordinary Civil Claim, 6 FLA.
L. Rzv. 157 (1953); Middleton, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 3 FLA. L. Rsv.
281 (1950); Comment, Validity of Arbitration Provisions in Federal Procurement Con.
tracts, 9 MIAMi L.Q. 451 (1955); Annotation, 55 A.L.R.2d 432 (1957).
132. FLA, STAT. § 57.11 (1957).
133. FLA. STAT. § 57.12 1) (1957),
134. FLA, STAT. § 57.12 4) (1957).
135. FLA, STAT. § 57.13 (1957)
136. FLA. STAT. § 57.18 1957)
137. FLA, STAT. § 57.19 (1957)
138. FLA. STAT. § 57.21 1957)1
139. FLA. STAT. § 57.23 1957).
140. FLA. STAT. § 57.22 1957).
141. FLA. STAT. § 57.24 1957).
142. FLA. STAT. § 57.29 1957).
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later, as to whether or not a labor-management contract is a "commercial"
contract, so as to fall within the coverage of the code.
CONCLUSION
The two year period covered by this survey has, with the exception
of the Miami Beach hotel dispute, been relatively quiet. The Supreme
Court of Florida, in its decisions concerning the hotel strike, has been
commendably conservative in its interpretation of the Florida Labor Organiza-
tions Act and has effectively restrained the activities of those who would
disregard the prerequisites of lawful picketing and to a lawful strike. The
court has furthermore exerted a fearless and successful hand in maintaining
law and order-a characteristic sometimes lacking in other courts.
43
We cannot help but view the activities of the Florida Legislature
with gratification. There seems little doubt that the introduction of a
workable Arbitration Code will be highly conducive to the orderly disposition
of many labor-management disputes without court action. The establish-
ment of the Florida Mediation and Conciliation Service, even though it is
not armed with the coercive powers of similar services in other states, 44
is an encouraging step and should provide the framework for a stronger
and more comprehensive service as the need becomes apparent.
It is to be hoped that Florida will continue to improve the services
it can so provide to prevent labor disputes and to cope with them when
they do arise. Only by improved state services will unwelcome federal
infiltration into this partial vacuum of governmental authority be fore-
stalled.
143. E.g., H. 0. Canfield Co. v. United Construction Workers, 136 Conn. 293, 70
A.2d 547 (1949).
144. As might be expected, state intervention in labor disputes is backed by strong
legislation in states where large sections of the nation's manufacturing facilities are lo-
cated. E.g., New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Michigan, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and Rhode Island. Surprisingly, such legislation also has been enacted in the lesser in-
dustrialized states of Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, and Utah, and in the Territory of
Hawaii.
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